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Abstract 
In October 2015, the Conservative government introduced a reform to the procedures of the 
House of Commons known as ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (or EVEL). This chapter 
examines how the Conservative party, which has historically been closely identified with 
unionism, became the architect of such a scheme. It documents how this topic emerged in 
political debate, following the implementation of devolution and, again, in the aftermath of 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. And it analyses EVEL’s operation at 
Westminster in 2015-17, uncovering tensions within it that point to deeper strains within 
Conservative party thinking. It concludes that EVEL needs to be understood not only as a 
response to the ‘West Lothian Question’, but also in relation to a longer-term disjuncture in 
the Conservative psyche arising from two competing conceptions of the nature and purpose 
of union.  
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6.1 Introduction 
On the morning after the Scottish independence referendum, in September 2014, prime 
minister David Cameron gave a speech in which he welcomed Scotland’s vote to remain in 
the UK, and went on to declare that: ‘I have long believed that a crucial part missing from 
this national discussion is England. We have heard the voice of Scotland – and now the 
millions of voices of England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English 
laws – the so-called West Lothian question – requires a decisive answer’ (Cameron 2014). 
This call led – following the election of a single-party Conservative government in May 2015 
– to the establishment of a new set of procedures in the House of Commons known as 
‘English Votes for English Laws’ (hereafter EVEL). The scheme created new mechanisms 
for MPs representing constituencies in England to vote down legislation that applies only in 
England. 
EVEL has been highly divisive in UK party politics and has been criticised by some for 




from the threat posed by Scottish nationalism. In response to Cameron’s post-referendum 
statement, Nick Clegg – then deputy prime minister and leader of the Liberal Democrats, the 
Conservatives’ coalition partners – declared this to be an exercise in ‘conventional party 
political point scoring’, warning that the Conservatives ‘could jeopardise the Union they 
purport to defend’ (Clegg 2014). 
How it is that the political party that has for so long seen itself as the traditional guardian of 
the union, and the inveterate opponent of devolution, became the architect of a policy which 
is seen by its opponents as endangering the union, remains somewhat mysterious. In this 
chapter we ask whether this reflects a deeper shift in the nature of the Conservative party’s 
approach to the union, explore different ways of understanding the evolution of its territorial 
statecraft, and emphasise some important differences of perspective within the party’s ranks. 
We consider the introduction of EVEL against this background, drawing on material gathered 
from a broader investigation which the authors have conducted into this reform.  
The chapter is organised into several discrete sections. We start by setting out the broad 
development of different strands of Conservative thinking about the union, followed by the 
various designs that began to emerge for institutionalising English control over Westminster 
legislation. There follows a close-up focus upon the period 2014–15, when the Conservative-
led coalition government sought to inject political energy into the English Question. We then 
focus on the design and operation of the EVEL procedures during the 2015–17 parliament, 
and identify some important political tensions and inconsistencies affecting them. In the next 
section we step back from these developments, drawing upon several existing interpretations 
of the UK’s territorial politics to deepen contemporary understanding of Conservative 
motivations and thought. We conclude with some reflections on how the Tory party might 
now be required to approach these issues, given the outcome of the 2017 general election and 
the imperatives associated with Brexit. 
6.2 The Conservatives, the union and devolution: a historical preamble 
Unionism has long been central to the Conservative party’s self-image, and this identity was 
forged in part during earlier moments when the idea of introducing devolution to different 
territories of the UK was under consideration. In response to political unrest in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a succession of Liberal governments sought to 
implement schemes for ‘home rule’ to Ireland, under which control over domestic matters 
would be transferred to a separate Irish legislature and executive. The Conservatives opposed 
such moves on the basis that home rule would weaken the integrity of the UK, and this 
opposition became a hallmark of the party’s approach to the union during this period. One of 
the most contentious features of arguments for devolution concerned the consequences of any 
home rule scheme for Westminster – and in particular how Ireland should be represented in a 
UK legislature that had only limited responsibility for Irish matters. Gladstone’s ‘in and out’ 
solution – included in his 1893 bill, under which Irish MPs would continue to sit at 
Westminster but would only be entitled to vote on certain matters – was ultimately regarded 
by him as unworkable (Bogdanor 2001). But the political conflicts stirred by debates about a 




Liberal party resulted in a small group of Liberal Unionists forming an alliance with the 
Conservatives, a development which led ultimately to the formation of today’s ‘Conservative 
and Unionist’ party. 
Against this historical backdrop, the Conservative party’s current enthusiasm for the idea of 
giving new voting rights to English MPs is, at first sight, surprising. Yet the move represents 
the culmination of a process of argument and deliberation that has been happening for several 
decades. This involved acceptance by many of the party’s post-war leaders, most notably 
Edward Heath, of the case for limited devolution to Scotland in order to stabilise the wider 
unionist project, followed by the adoption, once more, of a more sceptical position in the 
wake of Margaret Thatcher’s emergence as leader in the 1970s. One of the key episodes in 
this process was the attempt of the James Callaghan government in the late 1970s to 
introduce devolution to Scotland and Wales. Speaking in the debates on the Scotland Bill in 
1977 Conservative MP Francis Pym, Shadow Leader of the Commons, expressed fears that 
‘the consequences of this Bill, if enacted, will in the course of time damage the Union and 
could conceivably prove fatal to its continuance’ (HC Deb 14 November 1977: col. 74). The 
same Commons debate also provided the occasion for Labour MP Tam Dalyell to pose his 
iconic ‘West Lothian Question’ for the first time: 
For how long will English constituencies and English hon. Members tolerate 
not just 71 Scots, 36 Welsh and a number of Ulstermen but at least 119 hon. 
Members from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an important, 
and probably often decisive, effect on English politics while they themselves 
have no say in the same matters in Scotland, Wales and Ireland? (HC Deb 14 
November 1977: col. 123) 
During the course of the bill’s passage, the Conservatives backed a proposal that would have 
enabled certain votes that were carried by Scottish MPs, but did not apply in Scotland, to be 
confirmed two weeks later by a second Commons vote. The rationale for this was to give 
MPs the chance to reconsider their original decision. The party’s leadership defended this 
solution as maintaining the equality of all MPs, thus distinguishing it from Gladstone’s earlier 
‘in and out’ proposal (Francis Pym, HC Deb 17 July 1978: col. 159). 
This particular response to the West Lothian Question disappeared from view along with 
Labour’s devolution proposals of that period.1 But the issue resurfaced, and this time more 
resonantly, in the context of debates triggered by the devolution settlements introduced in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the late 1990s. For many of its unionist supporters, 
devolution was, in part, intended to offset concerns about England’s dominance within the 
union, and head off the growing threat of nationalism in different parts of the UK. But in its 
1997 manifesto the Conservative party warned that Labour’s devolution proposals would 
‘create strains which could well pull apart the Union’ (Conservative Party 1997: 50). 
                                                           
1 Both the Scotland Act 1978 and the Wales Act 1978 required devolution to be approved through a referendum 
in which a majority (comprising at least 40 per cent of eligible electors) voted in support. The subsequent 
referendum in Wales did not achieve majority support, while in Scotland the slim majority in favour did not pass 




6.3 Early designs for EVEL 
Following successful campaigns in September 1997, devolution was introduced by Labour in 
both Scotland and Wales against the objections of the Conservatives. But, having drawn 
attention to the salience and intractability of the West Lothian Question during these earlier 
debates, the Conservatives began to entertain new ideas for solving it, and linked these to the 
demand for some kind of counter-balancing reform for England as a response to the 
asymmetry created by a devolution settlement which did not extend to the largest part of the 
Kingdom. In a speech delivered in February 1998, Conservative leader William Hague 
signalled his intention to begin ‘a full debate’ about further reform (Hague 1998). And, 
writing in his autobiography in this period, Heath set out his own view that Scottish MPs 
could be prevented from voting on England-only legislation (Heath 1998: 565). During the 
course of the next two decades, more detailed proposals were aired in Conservative circles, 
contributing to a developing body of specialist knowledge on this question, and enabling the 
party to include commitments to introduce a version of EVEL in its general election 
manifestos from 2001 onwards (Conservative Party 2001, 2005, 2010). 
The first major contribution to this debate was the report of the Commission to Strengthen 
Parliament (2000), a body appointed by Hague and chaired by the Conservative peer (and 
constitutional expert) Lord (Philip) Norton of Louth. Under its proposals, the Commons 
Speaker would be required to certify the territorial application of legislation, and any 
provisions applying exclusively to England (or England and Wales) would then pass through 
a revised Commons legislative process, with second reading, committee and report stages all 
voted on by English (or English and Welsh) MPs only, and reflecting the party balance in that 
part of the UK. For third reading (the bill’s final stage during its initial Commons passage), 
all MPs would formally be entitled to vote, but the commission anticipated the development 
of a convention that those representing parts of the UK not affected by the legislation would 
not do so. In effect, the commission thus envisaged England-only legislation being voted on 
by English MPs alone, which represented a relatively robust, ‘full-strength’ version of EVEL. 
The salience of this issue was significantly boosted by the contentious passage of legislation 
that applied primarily to England during Blair’s second term in government, on the issues of 
tuition fees and foundation hospitals (Russell and Lodge 2006). The government’s reliance 
on Scottish MPs in key parliamentary votes on these bills stirred a loud chorus of complaint, 
particularly in Conservative circles (e.g. Tim Yeo, HC Deb 27 January 2004: col. 275). These 
votes also attracted extensive commentary about the injustices being done to England, from 
press and politicians alike, and appear to have touched a nerve among some English 
audiences. Analysis of mainstream national media, for instance, shows that mentions in the 
UK press of the term ‘West Lothian Question’ – a useful indicator of interest in this topic – 




Figure 6.1: Newspaper mentions of West Lothian Question per year, 1996–2015 
 
Source: LexisNexis search of UK national newspapers for the term ‘West Lothian Question’, 
conducted by the authors, 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2015. 
 
A new version of EVEL was subsequently elaborated in a report produced by the 
Conservative Democracy Task Force (2008), set up by party leader David Cameron and 
chaired by Kenneth Clarke MP. This body was an important part of the political attempt to 
brand the Conservatives as concerned about democratic questions, to many of which an 
increasingly unpopular Labour government appeared insensitive. Clarke’s report 
recommended that legislation certified as English should pass through a Commons legislative 
process that afforded MPs from England, and also those from across the UK, veto rights at 
different stages. The second and third reading stages of bills would, on this model, be voted 
on by the whole House, allowing all MPs the chance to vote against the entire bill at either 
end of its Commons passage. But English MPs would have control at committee and report 
stages – the two Commons stages at which a bill is amendable – enabling them to revise or 
delete any provisions that they disagreed with (and/or to add new ones). In comparison with 
Norton, this represented a ‘medium-strength’ variant of EVEL – as the passage of England-
only legislation would require the assent of both English and UK-wide MPs, but neither 
would have the power to force through legislation against the wishes of the other. 
But the most influential and important document setting out the arguments for reform 
emerged from outside the party. It was produced by the McKay Commission (2013), an 
independent body established by the government as part of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition agreement (HM Government 2010), and chaired by the highly-respected 
former Clerk of the Commons, Sir William McKay.2 The commission concluded that, post-
                                                           









































































devolution, English voters needed to have their interests more clearly delineated and 
protected at Westminster – perhaps the first time this hitherto heterodox argument had been 
so clearly accepted in official quarters (Kenny 2015). Yet these unconventional notes were 
blended with more constitutionally orthodox ideas. Thus, in contrast with some of the earlier 
proposals circulating within the Conservative party, the commission explicitly rejected the 
establishment of a formal veto right for English representatives, instead preferring 
mechanisms to enable their preferences, or ‘voice’, to be more clearly articulated and 
acknowledged. 
These various proposed answers to the West Lothian Question are an important barometer of 
the growing conviction in different parts of the political world that some kind of balancing 
reform was required to alleviate the asymmetries bequeathed by devolution. Arguments for 
such a reform generated some important intellectual and policy tributaries within the 
Conservative party. An equally important impact was to help legitimate the notion that the 
English were entitled to expect a more substantial degree of recognition and protection within 
the UK parliament. And the appearance of this idea in such ‘official’ quarters is one sign that 
the long-established consensus that the West Lothian Question was insoluble, was starting to 
crack. 
6.4 The English Question Emerges: 2014–15 
The appearance of the McKay Commission’s report caused little stir in 2013, except in 
specialist constitutional circles. Labour simply ignored it, having already declined to make 
any submission to it. For the government, too, the commission was widely understood as a 
sop to the Conservative party’s base, engendering little interest from either coalition party's 
leadership. Behind the scenes, the requirement to formulate an official government reply 
sparked limited discussions between the two parties, with some Liberal Democrat figures 
willing to explore the possibility of achieving an agreement that it could trade for other policy 
concessions as part of the bargaining game that had come to define intra-governmental 
relations by 2013. Accordingly, representatives of the two parties hammered out an 
agreement on a version of EVEL. But, although this proposal was put before the prime 
minister and deputy prime minister, it was not pursued any further – a telling sign of the lack 
of interest in this question, at this juncture, among either party’s leadership.3 
Further progress on the agenda was stimulated by the Scottish independence referendum, and 
a growing conviction in Conservative circles that, in its aftermath, the English Question 
needed to be publicly aired, and might also present tactical benefits for the party. Indeed, 
Conservative interest in this issue was already growing, partly in response to the sharp rise in 
popularity of UKIP in 2012–13 and the appeal of its brand of populist nationalism to 
disillusioned Conservative voters. While UKIP’s primary focus was upon the issues of 
immigration and Europe, its core support lay in England, and some of its senior figures were 
keen to speak to English grievances in the context of the Scottish referendum. UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage raised the question of English representation during the weeks leading up to the 
                                                           




referendum vote (BBC News 2014), and various opinion surveys from the period reported 
that a striking number of those to whom the party appealed tended to identify as English 
rather than British (Jeffery et al. 2014; Ford & Sobolewska, chapter 8 of this volume). The 
concern that the Conservatives were being outflanked by a party that spoke more directly to a 
mood of heightened English irritation weighed heavily on the former’s strategists.  
But the growing salience of the English constitutional issue also represented a response to a 
different kind of political incentive: the chance to outmanoeuvre the Conservatives’ main 
opponents on an issue which the Scottish referendum had brought to the fore. Both Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats had generally favoured schemes for greater regional self-
government in England as their preferred response to the English Question, as John Denham 
discusses in chapter 7. This preference was bound up with the association many progressives 
drew between English national identity and right-wing political attitudes. Both parties 
responded to the Conservatives’ interest in the West Lothian anomaly by challenging the 
latter’s unionist credentials and offering a defence of the new status quo – as exemplified by 
Clegg’s response to Cameron’s statement above.  
Having aired the question of English grievance on 19 September 2014, Cameron moved to 
establish a cabinet committee chaired by William Hague, the then Leader of the House of 
Commons, to consider how best to implement EVEL. The outcome of this process was a 
command paper that, very unusually, set out four different options for reform: three 
Conservative and one Liberal Democrat proposals (Leader of the House of Commons 2014). 
The Conservative options were based on the earlier proposals, discussed above: Norton’s 
relatively ‘full-strength’ variant; Clarke’s ‘medium-strength’ model; and an option based on 
some of the McKay Commission’s proposals, but strengthened to incorporate a formal veto. 
The appearance of disagreement within the government’s ranks was accentuated by the 
publication of the separate Liberal Democrat option.4  
The Conservative party’s grassroots in this period tended to favour stronger versions of 
EVEL, of the kind proposed by Norton. A survey of party members for the Conservative 
Home website found that 78 per cent favoured completely barring MPs from outside England 
from voting on English-only matters, while only a 33 per cent supported the weaker solution 
of an English-only committee stage (Goodman 2014).5 This more robust form of EVEL also 
attracted significant support among the parliamentary party. Some, such as high-profile 
backbencher John Redwood (2015), had long advocated such a position, and informal 
canvassing of parliamentary opinion also led the party leadership to appreciate that this was 
the preferred option of a substantial section of its own Commons backbenchers.6 Others 
favoured a rather different approach, seeking to bridge the party’s unionist heritage, its 
support for the idea of devolution outside England and the need to adapt the UK parliament to 
obviate English concerns. Thus, a pamphlet written by constitutional expert Roger Gough and 
                                                           
4 This emphasised devolution of power within England and argued that the party balance on any new England-
only parliamentary body should be determined based on the votes cast for each party rather than its number of 
MPs. 
5 Respondents to this survey were able to register their support for multiple options, or for a single one. 




backbench MP Andrew Tyrie (2015) argued that, although a formal veto right for the 
Commons was now necessary – a commitment that went further than the McKay 
Commission’s proposals – a ‘full-strength’ version of EVEL risked destabilising the union. 
Debates about EVEL were only one manifestation of a much broader shift in territorial 
thinking within the Conservative party in these years. In 2014 a review into Scottish 
governance, commissioned by the Scottish Conservatives and chaired by Tory peer Lord 
Strathclyde, concluded that Scotland should be granted a significant measure of fiscal 
devolution, reflecting a wider argument for a looser union which did not make so many 
demands upon English taxpayers (Scottish Conservatives 2014). Separately, various 
Conservative commentators were by now openly questioning the rationale for union, and the 
depth of the party’s commitment to it. Writing in The Spectator, Matthew Parris (2010) 
expressed surprise at the discovery of his own profound indifference to the fate of the union. 
Other pundits sympathetic to the party were more troubled by the divergence between 
England and the UK, but could not see a way around this trend (Moore 2014). For some 
English Conservatives, it was increasingly apparent that their commitment to England, and 
maintaining the traditional sovereign authority of the state, counted for more than 
maintaining the domestic union; but for many other Tories, the need to preserve the union 
and head off further territorial conflicts remained paramount. 
EVEL’s re-emergence on the political agenda temporarily pushed the Liberal Democrats 
towards their Labour opponents, given their overlapping outlooks on this issue. In late 2014 
the two parties privately discussed supporting an amendment to a government bill to force the 
establishment of a constitutional convention, whose remit would include options for greater 
English scrutiny of legislation, but this dialogue came to nothing.7 Meanwhile the 
Conservatives plumped for the third model of EVEL set out in Hague’s paper (the 
strengthened version of the McKay proposals) but were unable to secure support from the 
Liberal Democrats to put the matter to a vote in the Commons. In the 2015 general election 
campaign the Conservative party included the proposals in its manifesto (Conservative Party 
2015a), and the pledge was also central to its ‘English manifesto’ – the first occasion it had 
published such a document (Conservative Party 2015b). 
6.5 The operation of English Votes for English Laws, 2015–17  
Having promised in its manifesto to table its proposals within the first 100 days of the general 
election, the newly-elected Conservative government moved quickly to implement its 
commitment on this issue. Two months after the election, the incoming Leader of the House, 
Chris Grayling, published a series of proposed changes to the ‘standing orders’ of the 
Commons (the formal rules that govern procedure in that chamber). These were ultimately 
approved by MPs – following a series of relatively minor revisions – in October 2015. 
Under these new procedures, MPs representing constituencies in England (and England and 
Wales) were accorded the opportunity to veto legislative provisions that applied only in the 
relevant part of the UK. To achieve this, the Commons Speaker was given a new 
                                                           




responsibility to examine legislation for its territorial application, and to ‘certify’ any 
provision that met specified criteria. Legislation thus certified would then require the consent 
of MPs from the area concerned for it to pass the Commons, exercised primarily through new 
‘legislative grand committees’. Importantly, this veto right did not override the existing right 
of the whole House to vote at the main legislative stages, including the ability to reject any 
bill or to make amendments to it. This constitutive aspect of the reform – labelled the ‘double 
veto’ by some commentators – meant that legislation certified as applying only to England 
required approval by a majority of both English and UK-wide MPs for it to be passed.8 In 
broad terms, the government opted for a medium-strength version of EVEL – avoiding the 
more robust proposals associated with some of its backbenchers, while also offering a 
substantive innovation in the form of an unprecedented ‘English veto’ which proved highly 
unpopular with its political opponents. 
In the final vote to approve the procedures, MPs divided neatly along party lines. All those in 
favour were Conservatives, while all opposed were from other parties (including one 
independent).9 Yet this apparent unanimity masked some unease within the Conservative 
parliamentary party about the risks that EVEL might pose for the union, and various figures 
expressed concern about the implications of a radical redesign of the UK constitution which 
might unduly complicate the business of the Commons and aggravate territorial tensions. 
These views were aired, for instance, by backbench MPs Dominic Grieve and Edward Leigh, 
who raised concerns about how EVEL might apply on legislation with so-called ‘Barnett 
consequentials’ – referring to the practice by which the block grant to the devolved bodies is 
adjusted by reference to English spending decisions. Leigh spoke for a small, but not 
insignificant, minority of Tories when he argued that ‘the Union is at stake’ (HC Deb 7 July 
2015: col. 197). Such arguments reflected a deeper fear that, while the Conservatives may 
well have achieved short-term political advantage by tabling this issue, the reform also had 
the potential to accentuate a long-standing weakness in the party’s own territorial position – 
making even more transparent the predominantly English base of its parliamentary 
representation. Equally, the SNP’s ascendancy in Scottish politics presented a new dilemma 
for the Conservative party, bringing into British politics a powerful Anglo-Scottish tension of 
the kind that British statecraft has long sought to defuse. 
There have also been early signs of a very different pressure among those calling for a more 
robust form of EVEL, usually on the ground that the English now wanted for themselves 
what had been offered to other national groups in the UK. And the relative limitations of the 
new system, from this perspective, were illustrated in 2016 by the government’s attempts to 
relax Sunday trading laws through its Enterprise Bill. Although the policy would have 
applied only in England and Wales, and attracted majority support from English and Welsh 
MPs, it was defeated by UK-wide MPs – with the votes of Scottish MPs proving decisive 
(Gover and Kenny 2016b). In fact, the way in which the government drafted this provision 
                                                           
8 For further explanation and discussion of the procedures, see Gover and Kenny (2016a, 2018). 
9 Division result 312-270. Those voting in favour: Conservative (312). Those voting against: Labour (200), 
Scottish National Party (54), Democratic Unionist Party (6), Liberal Democrat (3), Plaid Cymru (3), Social 





(by also including material that would have applied in Scotland) meant that it would not have 
been certified under EVEL by the Speaker – a situation that throws into relief the potential 
for future governments to circumnavigate these procedures should they wish to do so. But, 
even if the clause had related solely to England and Wales, the ‘double veto’ aspect of EVEL 
would have meant that all MPs would still have had the power to block the policy. This 
feature of EVEL also set limits upon Conservative ambitions in other policy areas that pertain 
only to England (or England and Wales), such as foxhunting and grammar schools. For how 
long the current procedures will retain the support of those who wish for a more full-throated 
form of English legislative control remains far from clear.  
This new system has been afflicted by other inconsistencies and strains as well. It has, rather 
notably, been justified through reference to two quite distinct values. These can be associated 
with the achievement of a degree of ‘voice’, on the one hand, and the provision of a veto, on 
the other. Whereas arguments for an enhanced English voice in parliament tend to emphasise 
opportunities for deliberation and the importance of some degree of recognition for the 
English interest, the idea of veto refers to the particular right to block legislation from being 
imposed on England against the wishes of its elected representatives. Cameron, as noted 
above, responded to the result of the Scottish independence referendum by arguing that it was 
time for ‘the millions of voices of England [to] be heard’, while his party’s subsequent 
English manifesto pledged to address ‘the need for English MPs to express their voice on 
matters affecting England only’ (Conservative Party 2015b: 8). Yet when it turned to 
implement EVEL, his government ended up delivering a comprehensive kind of procedural 
veto, and did little to encourage the enhancement of voice. There is, for instance, little 
incentive for MPs to view the new ‘legislative grand committees’ as meaningful deliberative 
forums. During the 2015-17 parliament these committees were almost entirely perfunctory, 
most concluding without any substantive contributions at all (Gover and Kenny 2016a, 2018). 
In its presentation of these reforms, the government also tended to conflate two very different 
understandings of their purpose. Specifically, it interlaced the kind of conservative case for 
judicious, incremental adjustment – which defenders of the constitutional order, from 
Edmund Burke through to today’s moderate voices in the party, have favoured – with the 
language of popular sovereignty and suppressed nationhood, themes which Enoch Powell and 
Margaret Thatcher brought into the mainstream of party thinking. These different arguments 
speak to different parts of the British Conservative tradition which have long held differing 
perspectives on issues of nationhood and constitution. The first of these strands evolved, after 
the end of the empire, towards a different vision of the United Kingdom, as a flexible polity 
which could accommodate modest forms of devolution and could pool sovereignty within a 
wider European arrangement. Its adherents have generally supported reform to the UK’s 
internal constitutional arrangements for prudential reasons – including to protect the union 
from the potential disaffection of the largest national population of the UK. Its leading 
proponents, such as Kenneth Clarke and Andrew Tyrie, tend to be sceptical about the idea 
that the union can function if England is accorded some form of devolution in an attempt to 




Chris Grayling’s contention that EVEL would serve ‘to strengthen the Union’ by making it 
fairer and more balanced (HC Deb 2 July 2015: col. 1667). 
Yet Cameron’s rhetoric in September 2014, and much Conservative discourse since, gestured 
simultaneously at a very different idea – the notion, associated with contemporary figures like 
MPs John Redwood and David Davis, that England deserves the same democratic rights that 
have been granted to the other parts of the UK. This perspective has its roots in the vision of 
parliamentary sovereignty and English heritage which were advanced from the political 
margins by Powell, and were institutionalised in the party’s mainstream by Thatcher and her 
successors. On this – arguably more ‘Jacobin’ – view, England cannot retain its sovereignty 
while involved in a legal or political union with other countries, and it regards the domestic 
union as viable only when framed and managed on England’s terms. Technical adjustments 
to the legislative rules of the House of Commons are unlikely to measure up to the heady 
rhetoric of self-government and ‘taking back control’ which this second discourse invokes. 
The disjuncture between the reality and some of the rhetoric associated with this reform has 
created a space which disenchantment, and more radical demands on behalf of the English, 
may come to fill. Senior backbenchers like Redwood are adamant that the terms of the 
devolved union place undue constraints upon the English, and have demanded to know why 
the principle of self-government has not been extended to the largest nation of the UK. As he 
put it to William Hague in a Commons debate in 2014: ‘England expects English votes for 
English issues. We expect simplicity and justice now: no ifs, no buts, no committee 
limitations, no tricks. Give us what we want. We have waited 15 years for this. Will he now 
join me in speaking for England?’ (HC Deb 16 December 2014: col. 1270). Such figures are 
willing to support EVEL in the short term, on the tacit understanding that it works to ensure 
that English interests are not disregarded in parliament, but they may turn against the current 
system should it prove unable to guarantee that the preferences of English MPs are not 
overridden. 
In practical terms, however, the notion of achieving devolution at the English level faces 
enormous obstacles, not least because there are no extant institutions of English governance, 
and English affairs are so interwoven into the development of UK-wide policy and 
legislation. For this reason, too, Cameron’s rhetoric sat awkwardly with the tradition, 
referenced above, of Conservative pragmatism towards the constitutional machinery of the 
UK. Distinct arrangements for the governance of the non-English territories have long been a 
hallmark of the British state, as has been the absence of England as a distinct entity within the 
functionally defined structures of the state, as discussed by Jim Gallagher in chapter 4 of this 
volume. Arguments about the possibility and wisdom of labelling as ‘English’ those 
government departments with functions that are now exercised primarily in relation to 
England, have begun to break the surface of British politics in recent years, and a number of 
public bodies – for instance NHS England – have quietly started to announce their territorial 
jurisdiction. But these developments remain under the political radar, and calls for some kind 
of equivalent devolution arrangement for England remain fundamentally at odds with the 




The Conservative government’s presentation of EVEL reflects a tendency to ‘over claim’, 
and a desire to appeal simultaneously to different parts of the party, which may come to have 
significant repercussions for the union as a whole. But these inconsistencies and tensions are 
perhaps also an indication that Conservative thinking about England’s place within the 
domestic union is less anchored than it once was. In the final main section of this chapter, we 
discuss different ways of understanding the much broader shift in party thinking that led to 
the introduction of EVEL.  
6.6 The decline of unionist statecraft? 
To gain analytical purchase on this issue, we draw insights from three notable, and broadly 
complementary, accounts of the historical development and character of Conservative 
thinking about the territorial dimensions and constitutional character of the UK state: Andrew 
Gamble’s analysis of the re-assertion of the enduring English core of British Conservatism; 
Jim Bulpitt’s account of the kind of territorial statecraft which was integral to the 
Conservative political outlook, and which became increasingly problematic from the 1980s 
onwards; and Richard Rose’s observation of the role played by the party system in providing 
an underpinning for the union. 
For Gamble (2016) the Anglo-centric vision of the UK that became apparent in Conservative 
circles in the early 2000s should be seen as the continuation of an older version of Toryism 
that was partially effaced by the ascendancy of unionism and empire, but never entirely 
eclipsed by either. While allegiance to the union has long been key to this lineage, it had 
always been secondary to the need to protect the sovereignty of the British state, the core of 
which is England and its traditional institutions. The Conservatives, he suggests, have 
become increasingly willing and ready to discard the garments that were once so important to 
Conservative identity. For a growing number of today’s Tories, the passion and enthusiasm 
once elicited by the UK as a multi-national state have steadily dissipated over the last few 
decades. And so, while the union remains important and valued, it is for many Conservatives 
glimpsed in increasingly instrumental terms – as a source of Britain’s geo-political standing, 
or conduit to economic prosperity. Latterly it has come to be seen increasingly as a constraint 
and a burden – a potential block upon England’s aspirations and sovereignty. For now, the 
union subsists in Conservative party thinking so long as other parts of the UK participate 
within it on English terms, and show that they are willing to share the priorities and outlook 
associated with the Conservatives. But Gamble detects an underlying, tectonic shift in 
mentality on the part of many Tories. This position, he suggests, takes the party back to its 
‘Tory roots, shorn of the Whig trappings of union and empire which have been the 
framework of Conservative politics for so long’ (Gamble 2016: 361). 
The appetite among parts of the Conservative party for maintaining the old union state, and 
its attendant constitutional order, has, Gamble observes, been waning for some while. Key 
episodes in this process include the fissure that opened between Ulster Unionism and British 
Conservatism, the decline of unionism and the Conservative presence in Scotland, and the 
party’s diminished standing in the post-industrial cities of northern England, all of which 




view, the shift towards a more accommodationist approach to both the European and 
domestic unions that prevailed in the party from the era of Macmillan to Heath, gave way to a 
re-assertion of a unitary understanding of the UK, viewed through the lens of a traditional 
English constitutionalism. This set in train a rejection of devolution under Thatcher as she 
sought to re-build a different ‘politics of nationhood’ (Lynch 1999) for the party. Thatcher’s 
tenure was, on this account, a vital moment in the journey that Gamble describes. In 
important respects she laid the foundations for the revival of a political Englishness and the 
emergence of an Anglo-centric Euroscepticism among many British Conservatives, a force 
which played a major role in the UK’s referendum on EU membership in June 2016. 
Cameron’s talk in September 2014 of protecting England’s interests, and enhancing 
England’s hitherto suppressed voice, continued in this trajectory established by Thatcher. 
And EVEL, on this view, looks like a further step towards the re-assertion of England as the 
more authentic and integral political community for the Conservative party.  
Important and insightful as this interpretation is, whether Gamble’s characterisation captures 
the entirety of the party and its traditions of thinking – or merely an important and 
increasingly influential, part of it – is a key question. The ‘double veto’ feature of EVEL is 
revealing on this score, in that it also reflects a desire by party managers to appease those 
Conservatives who remain committed to an older, Heathite vision of the UK constitution. 
Gamble’s emphasis on an enduring lineage of English Toryism over the last century or more, 
can be usefully complemented by an appreciation of profound shifts in the instincts and 
wisdom associated with those charged with territorial management on the part of the British 
state over the same period. Jim Bulpitt’s (1983) suggestive, and much debated, historical 
sketch of the changing ‘territorial statecraft’ of previous eras also sheds light on the 
judgements and calculations of elite actors in relation to the constitutional order. In particular, 
his characterisation of the demise of the relatively stable territorial system of the middle 
decades of the twentieth century (which he christened the era of the ‘dual polity’) helps us 
understand, more generally, the dissolution of the co-ordinates and governing reflexes 
associated with Conservative statecraft. 
Bulpitt’s interpretation stemmed from a ‘realist’ appreciation of the gap that existed between 
official rhetoric about the merits of the unitary state, on the one hand, and the complex and 
variegated manner in which territorial management was undertaken by the centre in Britain, 
on the other. Put simply, this involved the granting of strategic concessions to local elites to 
protect the basic autonomy of the central British state. While the English parliament ceased 
formally to exist in 1707, in practice it expanded after union with Scotland, absorbing 
territories from other parts of Britain, and becoming the legislature of the whole UK. 
Securing the hegemony of the state within this expanded territory was premised upon the 
recognition that special arrangements might be necessary for the governance of its non-
English territories. The domestic elite, he intimated, tended to prefer short-term fixes and to 
avoid systematic reforms, and sought instinctively to avoid foundational and principled 
solutions to constitutional and territorial problems – a judgement that casts an important 
shadow over some of the territorial ‘fixes’ that have been attempted in the last two decades, 




was defined in terms of its inclination to stay above territorial politics itself, and to keep the 
latter at some remove, both in terms of its objectives and in the composition and personal 
relations of its elite.  
Bulpitt’s characterisation of the period of relative stability in territorial relations, which 
prevailed from the 1920s to the 1960s, as the era of the ‘dual polity’, is of particular interest 
because of his account of the reasons for, and consequences of, its dissolution. In these 
decades there emerged a relatively stable settlement based upon the attempt of party leaders, 
especially Tory ones, at the centre to ensure that the realm of ‘high politics’ was insulated 
from the demands bubbling up from the localities. To achieve this separation, a considerable 
degree of autonomy was offered to sympathetic local elites. To this end, a succession of 
Conservative leaders granted enhanced administrative autonomy, and, for the most part, held 
back from pursuing centralist ambitions or attempting to achieve uniformity across the UK. It 
was in this period that the Macmillanite ethos merged with a new, modernising current of 
Conservatism which saw merits in pooling sovereignty with other European countries. This 
settlement ultimately started to unwind during the late 1970s, and, as yet, no stable alternative 
to it has been located. During the Thatcher era, the Conservatives’ avowed appeal to what 
Bulpitt termed ‘provincial England’, and attempt to re-introduce a more centralised form of 
governance and unitary perspective on the UK, made it highly likely that territorial politics 
would become a major field of conflict once more.  
While it is hard to divine how Bulpitt would have responded to events that followed his own 
death (in 1999), his scepticism about the prospects for a stable future for the UK after 
devolution merits consideration in the light of subsequent events. The turn towards greater 
self-government as a way of solving the problem of the growing appeal of nationalism in the 
peripheral territories was, in his view, mistaken, since it meant creating political structures 
which might be captured by actors who did not wish to play the role ascribed by the central 
state to compliant elites, and whose appeal would lie in their capacity to mobilise opposition 
to the state – a judgement that has proved immensely prescient in the case of Scotland. He 
feared as well that setting the UK’s informal and flexible arrangements on a more formal, 
quasi-legal, footing would create the kinds of institutional obstacle and minority advantage 
that were likely to inflame the resentments of the English majority and limit the flexibility 
and room for manoeuvre of those tasked with managing territorial affairs. 
Since 2007, there are various indications that the statecraft paradigm which Bulpitt believed 
had evolved over successive centuries has entered a period of profound crisis. One sign of its 
increasingly dysfunctional character is the growing polarisation between the ways in which 
the two main UK parties have approached constitutional issues, a situation which is a major 
contributor to current instability and a crucial backdrop to Cameron’s decision to inject 
political energy into the English Question in 2014. According to Richard Rose (1974), the 
stability of the British model rested to a considerable degree upon the capacity of the party 
system to defuse territorial and national tensions, and promote functional over national 
questions in political life. In the last decade, this deepening conflict suggests that, contrary to 




than a defuser of tension. Not since the Irish Question raged has such deep doctrinal division 
over territory and state been so prevalent in high politics in the UK. 
In the current period, as discussed by John Denham in chapter 7 of this volume, Labour has, 
for the most part, remained hostile to arguments about devolution for England, offering a 
tepid case for administrative decentralisation to its regions and largest cities – an approach 
which has tended to lack popular resonance, and was viewed in some quarters as an 
illegitimate attempt, with Brussels’ connivance, to break England apart. The Conservatives, 
meanwhile, have become the champions of the English interest in UK politics. In this 
context, issues such as West Lothian have come to be viewed in strongly partisan terms, and 
the prospects for some kind of cross-party consensus on the future shape of the UK 
constitution appears to have receded. These differences have been over-determined by the 
parties’ divergent and increasingly fractured territorial bases (a situation that has in turn been 
accentuated by the retention of one of the features commonly associated with the 
‘Westminster model’: the First Past the Post voting system for UK general elections). 
Labour’s position (until 2015) as the UK party most likely to win Scottish and Welsh seats 
has rendered the party more wary of calls for constitutional change that might be 
disadvantageous to those peripheries, and especially suspicious of arguments for devolution 
to England as a whole. The perception in Labour circles that England is a fundamentally 
conservative country in electoral terms is – as Iain McLean (2007) has demonstrated – both 
influential and significantly overplayed in the party’s mind-set.  
For their Conservative counterparts, the mirror-image of this pattern of representation has 
also, over time, exercised an important influence upon the Tory outlook. As Northern Ireland 
became an electorally separate entity in the 1970s, and the Conservatives subsequently lost 
their foothold in Scotland, England became ever more important to their parliamentary 
position, and the party tended to win seats overwhelmingly in the south and south east. These 
are, broadly, places that are the largest net contributors to the public finances, compared to 
those Labour-represented ones that are the largest net recipients of them. This markedly 
bifurcated pattern of representation has done much to deepen and accentuate the divergent 
constitutional thinking of both parties, and served to inject political energy and conflict into 
some of the questions about constitutional order and territorial equity which the party system 
has, for the last century, been effective at managing and defusing, in Bulpittian terms.  
6.7 Conclusions 
These different, but overlapping, interpretations offer important insights into the trends and 
processes that have been integral to the complex evolution of the territorial politics of the 
British Conservative party. They bring into view the rich hinterland of Tory thinking about 
union, constitution and nation which lies behind the party’s increasing interest in the 
seemingly arcane West Lothian Question, and the growing belief of many Conservatives that 
its resolution could be intimately connected to the idea of rebalancing the union to assuage 
English anxieties and aspirations. Gamble’s interpretation, in particular, points to a gradual 
and inexorable shift in the Conservative party’s mind-set towards the notion that the 




English sovereignty. And EVEL may well be an important staging-post on the journey that he 
identifies. In complementary style, Rose’s analysis highlights the political contexts and 
factors that have been integral to the perpetuation of the union, a number of which are no 
longer necessarily conducive, we have suggested, to constitutional stability. 
Nevertheless, such is the contingent, and often unpredictable, character of political life that 
what looks, at one moment, like an established trend can at a later point seem like a more 
contingent and less linear phenomenon. In the volatile circumstances created by recent 
political events in the UK, the plurality of Conservative ways of thinking about the union, 
and England’s place within it, have become especially apparent and increasingly important. 
The key developments here were Theresa May’s catastrophic general election campaign in 
2017 and its surprising outcome, including the Conservative party’s loss of its Commons 
majority, a significant upturn of fortunes for the party in Scotland, and a stronger-than-
expected result for Labour in England. 
In contrast to 2015, the Conservative party opted not to publish an English manifesto in 2017, 
and made little attempt to evoke English grievances in its broader campaign. Indeed, the 
return of the party’s traditional billing as the ‘Conservative and Unionist’ party followed 
directly upon May’s attempt, since assuming the premiership in July 2016, to conciliate those 
parts of the UK that had voted against Brexit, while seeking also to promote a ‘hard’ version 
of it as the assumed expression of the will of the people. The election result has thrown much 
of this strategy into the air, and the ‘supply and confidence’ arrangement agreed with the 
Democratic Unionist Party means that the territorial dynamics at play within British politics 
have changed quite considerably. This unexpected development, allied to the party’s 
resurgence in Scotland, means that the Conservatives no longer look so unequivocally 
English in parliament, even though they remain by some margin the most popular party 
within England.  
Quite how the party will respond to this change in the territorial composition of its 
parliamentary strengths, and how also it will deal with Labour’s surprising appeal in parts of 
England where it was widely assumed that it would struggle, are now important and open-
ended political questions. And they are made more complicated still by the challenges 
associated with forging a parliamentary coalition in support of any particular Brexit deal. 
This shift in the territorial political landscape serves to put the arguments set out here under a 
new spotlight. It also throws into relief the persistence of some important countervailing 
forces to the seemingly inexorable drift of the Conservative party away from the union. 
While the party has, over the last few decades, become increasingly southern-English in its 
parliamentary base, its recent electoral successes in Wales, especially in 2015, and Scotland, 
in 2016 and 2017, may well have a bearing upon how the party comes to approach the union.  
In terms of EVEL more specifically, one of its most important features arises from its quasi-
legal character. This complex, and rather opaque, way of implementing a seemingly 
straightforward democratic principle means that EVEL is almost invisible to the wider public. 
Indeed, the procedures associated with it have served to ‘depoliticise’ the West Lothian 




late 2014. The inclination of the party’s current leadership is to keep things this way, but 
whether a future leader will follow the same path – especially if the question of additional 
devolution to other parts of the UK resurfaces, or the party finds itself in opposition but with 
a majority among English MPs – is uncertain. On the other hand, if EVEL does endure for 
the course of a full parliamentary term, the likelihood that it will become part of the furniture 
at Westminster, and cease to be the focus for party political debate, would increase 
considerably. 
Much is to be gained, we have suggested, from considering this controversial reform through 
the lens of two distinct historical processes. The first, shorter-term cycle to which we draw 
attention is the emergence since the late 1990s of the belief among many Conservatives that 
devolution had generated a degree of asymmetry which necessitated a further set of reforms 
to protect the position of England within the UK legislature. This emergent stream of 
thinking was focused primarily, though never entirely, on the West Lothian Question, and 
resulted in growing support across the party for the idea of EVEL. But this fairly recent 
development needs also to be understood in relation to a much longer political cycle – the 
historically rooted disjuncture in the Conservative psyche between those who believe that the 
UK can only survive if it continues to adapt to new challenges and attempts to resolve some 
of its anomalies when required to do so, on the one hand, and those who have come to believe 
that the UK needs to be re-imagined in unitary terms. In the wake of Thatcher, the rise of 
Euroscepticism in the party and the vote for Brexit, this latter tendency is now ascendant in 
both party and government. But following the 2017 general election result it is now 
compelled to operate in a situation which it no longer commands, and where it may well need 
to compromise with other constitutional ideas and visions. In these unforeseen and 
unprecedented circumstances, it is very likely that the party’s English journey may have some 
surprising, unexpected, twists to come. 
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